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Abstract—Vehicular communication plays a key role in near-
future automotive transport, promising features like increased
traffic safety, flexible insurance premiums, or wireless software
updates. However, vehicular communication can expose driver
locations and thus poses important privacy risks. Many schemes
have been proposed to protect privacy in vehicular communica-
tion, e.g. the use of short-term pseudonyms instead of long-term
identifiers. The effectiveness of these schemes is usually shown
using privacy metrics. However, to the best of our knowledge, (1)
different privacy metrics have never been compared to each other,
and (2) it is unknown how strong the metrics are. In this paper, we
argue that privacy metrics should be monotonic, i.e. that they
indicate decreasing privacy for increasing adversary strength,
and we evaluate the monotonicity of 37 privacy metrics on real
and synthetic traffic with state-of-the-art adversary models. Our
results indicate that (1) the strongest metrics are the expected
estimation error and normalized entropy, and (2) most privacy
metrics are weak at least in some situations. We therefore
recommend to use metrics suites, i.e. combinations of privacy
metrics, when evaluating new privacy-enhancing technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular wireless communication technologies like dedi-
cated short-range communications (DSRC) enable vehicles to
communicate with other vehicles and infrastructure nodes to
enable features like intersection collision avoidance, electronic
road pricing, or cooperative adaptive cruise control. To realize
these features, vehicles transmit sensitive data – often without
encryption – for example their location, speed, and heading.
This information can be used by anybody within wireless
transmission range to track vehicles and their drivers on a
large scale [5]. These privacy issues are well recognized,
and many schemes have been proposed to protect privacy.
For example, vehicles are often assumed to have pools of
pseudonyms in addition to a long-term identifier, and different
schemes have been proposed to switch between pseudonyms
in a privacy-preserving way without compromising safety and
accountability [9]. To evaluate how effectively these schemes
protect privacy, researchers use various privacy metrics.
Because privacy is difficult to quantify, privacy metrics
focus on quantities that are related to privacy, for example the
number of vehicles that an adversary cannot distinguish, or
the probability that an adversary can track a vehicle success-
fully. Many such metrics have been proposed, and researchers
usually select one or two metrics to evaluate a new scheme.
However, there is a lack of research into the metrics
themselves. In particular, we are not aware of research that
compares different privacy metrics, or that analyzes how
strong different privacy metrics are. This is an important
open problem because the accurate measurement of privacy
is essential to evaluate new privacy protections.
Contributions. In this paper, we make three contributions
to research into privacy metrics: (1) We define monotonicity
as a criterion for the strength of privacy metrics, i.e. we argue
that a privacy metric should indicate low privacy for strong
adversaries, and high privacy for weak adversaries. (2) We
describe a methodology how monotonicity can be evaluated
systematically and (3) we apply this methodology to study 37
privacy metrics proposed in the literature, including metrics
that have not been used in vehicular privacy before.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy metrics for vehicular communications. Several
privacy metrics have already been used in the vehicular
communications field, most notably the anonymity set size,
entropy, the adversary’s success rate, and the maximum track-
ing time [11]. Many more privacy metrics have been proposed
in other fields [13], but it is unclear whether they are suitable
for vehicular privacy. In this paper, we analyze the strength of
37 privacy metrics from vehicular privacy and other fields.
Evaluation of metrics. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no literature that compares or evaluates privacy metrics
for vehicular privacy. We have previously studied privacy
metrics for genomic privacy and proposed a methodology to
systematically evaluate the strength of privacy metrics [12].
III. METHODOLOGY
To evaluate how good privacy metrics are, i.e. the strength of
privacy metrics, we adapt the methodology we first introduced
for genomic privacy [12]. Our method provides a controlled
environment in which to experiment with privacy metrics by
abstracting from many of the factors that affect privacy in
the real world. For example, we assume that precise and
timely position updates are available for all cars – a best-
case scenario from the adversary’s viewpoint – instead of
considering network-level packet delays or losses.
Four components are needed to apply the method: (1) to
model user driving behavior, we use real-world traffic traces,
(2) to model the adversary, we implement a state-of-the-art
tracking algorithm, (3) to show how strong privacy metrics
are when applied to a specific combination of adversary and
user actions, we define monotonicity as a strength indicator,
and (4) we use 37 privacy metrics from the privacy literature.
We implemented all four components in Python using the
packages numpy, scipy, scikit-learn, and mpi4py [4].
TABLE I
TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR TIME/DAY COMBINATIONS
City Day Time Duration Vehicles Data points Veh/km2
Rome Mon 1pm 1800s 182 68k 0.16
Rome Tue 5pm 1800s 131 45k 0.18
Rome Wed 10am 1800s 139 48k 0.47
Rome Fri 8am 1800s 54 8k 0.04
Madrid Mon 11am 1000s 1597 1.3m 160
Madrid Tue 8am 1000s 2168 1.6m 217
Madrid Wed 11am 1000s 2215 2.0m 222
Madrid Fri 8am 1000s 2495 1.9m 250
A. Traffic Traces
The user actions in a vehicular network consist of traffic
traces that determine the locations and movement patterns of
vehicles, and thus the characteristics of the network traffic the
adversary can observe. For a meaningful evaluation of privacy
metrics, these traffic traces need to fulfill four requirements:
they should (1) be realistic, (2) represent varied environments,
(3) offer fine-grained position updates in the order of 1Hz,
and (4) consist of timestamps and positions (velocities can be
approximated from subsequent positions). We use two sets of
traffic traces, inner city traffic and highway traffic, to fulfill
these requirements.
For inner city traffic, we use taxi traces recorded in Rome
available from CRAWDAD [1], [3]. The dataset consists of
one month of measurements for 320 taxis, with one data point
every 7 seconds. Positions where the GPS precision was below
20m were filtered from the dataset. To offset these missing data
points, we reduced the granularity to 15 seconds.
For highway traffic, we use synthetic traffic from highways
near Madrid [7], [8]. The traffic characteristics were modeled
after empirical real-world traffic conditions on three high-
ways. The dataset provides traffic on three 10km stretches of
highway: one day of traffic on the four-lane M30, and eight
30-minute intervals on each M40 and A6 (both three lanes).
Measurements are available every 500ms.
Previous work showed that the characteristics of vehicular
network graphs differ depending on times of day and days of
the week [8]. To study whether privacy metrics are similarly
affected, we selected different combinations of times of day
and days of the week from each dataset (see Table I).
B. Adversary Models
The adversary in vehicular communications is often as-
sumed to be a passive observer who aims to track vehicles. To
evaluate the strength of privacy metrics, the adversary model
needs to (1) represent a realistic and strong adversary, and (2)
be adjustable to model adversaries of different strengths.
Tracking algorithm. To fulfill the requirement for a re-
alistic and strong adversary, we implemented a state-of-the-
art vehicle tracking algorithm, the joint probabilistic data
association filter (JPDA) (which is sometimes referred to as a
multiple hypothesis tracker (MHT) with zero-scan, i.e. a MHT
that maintains only one hypothesis [14]). Originally described
for radar tracking applications [2], [10], JPDA has since been
applied successfully to vehicle tracking [6], [14]. The JPDA
algorithm maintains a list of tracks, each representing one
vehicle. Periodically, a set of new observations arrives, and the
tracker attempts to find the best continuations for all tracks,
based on the positions and velocities of existing tracks and
observations, but not on vehicle identities. JPDA is based
on Kalman filtering, extended by the capability to resolve
situations where the association between existing tracks and
new observations is not unique.
Our implementation of JPDA closely follows the description
in [2], with inspiration for the definition of the state vector
and covariance matrices taken from [6], [14]. Here, we briefly
describe our choice of parameters. The state vector x for each
track consists of 2D positions and velocities, and the state
transition matrix A models the vehicle dynamics according
to which the state evolves from one time step to the next (1).
The tracker is subject to two kinds of noise: process noise rep-
resents uncertainty in state estimation due to random motion
entering the system between observations, and measurement
noise represents uncertainty in measurement. Both kinds of
noise are assumed to be normally distributed white noise with
covariances Q (process noise) and R (measurement noise) (2).
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To speed up the computations, the tracker uses gating to
eliminate unlikely associations, e.g. observations that are out-
side of the realistic travel distance for a vehicle. A frequently
used gating condition is the ellipsoidal gate that demands that
the norm of the residual vector is not larger than the gating
threshold G [10]. Our tracker uses G = 35.
Ordered strength levels. To fulfill the requirement for
adjustable adversary strengths, we adjusted the parameters
for the JPDA tracker. Because tracker performance strongly
depends on the values for the covariance matrices R and
Q [14], and because variation of these values is easy to
implement, we chose nine parameter levels for each r and
q (Eq. (2) shows how they are related to R and Q), with
r = [1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 80, 100, 140] and q = 0.1r.
To evaluate whether privacy metrics indicate high privacy
for weak adversaries and low privacy for strong adversaries,
the adversary strength levels need to be ordered. Figs. 1 and 2
show the probability the adversary assigns to the ground truth
(i.e. the probability that a vehicle’s track is continued with the
correct observation) and the percentage of correctly identified
vehicles at each time step, respectively, for four of the eight
data slices (the other figures show similar results). Each figure
shows one box for each of the nine adversary strength levels,
summarizing all vehicles and all time steps in the data slice.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Madrid, M40, Wednesday 11am (c) Rome, Monday 1pm (d) Rome, Friday 8am
Fig. 1. Probability the adversary assigns to the ground truth, by adversary strength level, ordered strongest to weakest from left to right
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Madrid, M40, Wednesday 11am (c) Rome, Monday 1pm (d) Rome, Friday 8am
Fig. 2. Percentage of correctly tracked vehicles, by adversary strength level, ordered strongest to weakest from left to right
The boxes indicates the upper and lower quartiles of this data,
the median is shown with a red line, and the mean with a grey
square. From the ends of the boxes, lines extend to the 5%
and 95% quantiles. It can be seen that 1 is consistently the
strongest adversary level and 140 the weakest. The adversary’s
strength between the strongest and weakest levels is decreasing
in almost every case, with the exception of Friday morning in
Rome (Fig. 2d). The reason for this is likely that the vehicle
density in this case (54 unique vehicles) is much lower than in
all other cases (130-180 unique vehicles). Overall, Figs. 1 and
2 confirm that our parameter levels for R and Q do indeed
result in ordered levels of adversary strength.
Note that the adversary’s strength is lower overall for Rome
compared to Madrid. This is because highway traffic (Madrid)
is much more regular and thus easier to track than inner-city
traffic (Rome), and also because position updates are available
in a much higher frequency for Madrid (500ms) compared to
Rome (15s).
C. Criteria for Metric Strength
To determine how strong a privacy metric is, we use the
criterion of monotonicity: with increasing adversary strength,
metrics should indicate decreasing privacy values. We have
previously proposed a formalization of the monotonicity crite-
rion and an algorithm to compute monotonicity values [12]. In
brief, the algorithm uses two statistical tests (Welch’s t-test and
the Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic) for each pair of successive
adversary strength levels to determine whether the difference
between mean metric values is statistically significant and
points in the expected direction (positive for higher-better
metrics, negative for lower-better metrics). Each outcome of
each statistical test is then assigned points: +1 for a difference
in the expected direction,  1 for a difference in the wrong
direction, and  2 for a change in direction (a peak means
that strong and weak adversaries cannot be distinguished and
is thus not desirable). The total monotonicity score, i.e. the
addition of these point values, can be visualized in heat maps
(see Section IV-G).
In addition to evaluating monotonicity, we discuss how the
values of each metric can be interpreted, and whether the
metrics are suitable to compare privacy between scenarios with
different traffic conditions.
D. Privacy Metrics
We study 37 privacy metrics that have been proposed in the
literature. Many of these have not been applied to vehicular
network privacy before. Our aim in including these metrics is
to identify strong privacy metrics that are not yet common in
the vehicular networking community, and thus to increase the
selection of metrics available.
IV. RESULTS
To compute the results on metric strength, we applied the
JPDA tracker to 2000 time steps of the four Madrid data slices
and 120 time steps of the four Rome data slices, and then
evaluated each of the privacy metrics in all scenarios and time
steps. In Sections IV-A to IV-F, we present detailed results
for the metrics, including a brief description and a discussion
how metric values can be interpreted and compared between
scenarios. For full descriptions, equations, and references for
each metric, we refer to [13]. Our presentation is grouped
into categories of metrics according to which kind of output
they measure (as proposed in [13]). Due to space limitations,
we omit detailed results for some metrics and only compare
two scenarios: Monday 11am in Madrid and Monday 1pm in
Rome. We present the full set of results on monotonicity for
all metrics and all scenarios in Section IV-G.
For each privacy metric and adversary strength level, we
plot one vertical violin plot. The vertical bars show the range
of the data, with horizontal lines indicating the minimum,
mean, and maximum. Two thin horizontal lines show the
confidence intervals for the mean. In addition, a kernel density
plot on each side of the bar indicates the probability density.
To illustrate the statistical distribution of the bulk of metric
values, we added the first and third quartile to the plot. We
fitted cubic splines to the quartiles and shade the area between
them to emphasize how the quartiles change depending on
adversary strength. In addition, we print the value of the mean
in boldface at the top of each violin. The green bars indicate
whether higher or lower values indicate higher privacy.
A. Uncertainty Metrics
The anonymity set size indicates how many vehicles the
adversary cannot distinguish. We approximate the anonymity
set size by counting the vehicles to which the tracker assigns
a non-zero probability. Fig. 3 shows that the anonymity set
size in Madrid (highway traffic) is much lower than in Rome
(inner-city taxi traffic), despite Rome having a much lower
traffic density. This may caused by waiting areas where inner-
city taxis wait for customers, and indicates that the anonymity
set size is sensitive to differences in traffic characteristics.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 3. Anonymity set size
Entropy indicates the adversary’s uncertainty as to which
member of the anonymity set is the true target. Fig. 4 shows
the value of entropy in bits, indicating that the uncertainty in
Madrid is lower than in Rome. However, the absolute value
of entropy is not easily comparable across scenarios because
it is influenced by the size of the anonymity set.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 4. Entropy
For this reason, normalized entropy uses the maximum
amount of entropy in a scenario to normalize entropy values
to a [0, 1] range which indicates the adversary’s degree of
uncertainty. Fig. 5 shows that inner-city traffic has a higher
degree of uncertainty than highway traffic. Note that the
difference is much smaller than the differences in entropy or
anonymity set size, which indicates that normalized entropy is
better suited for comparisons between scenarios.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 5. Normalized entropy
Some variations of entropy are based on Re´nyi entropy, a
parameterized generalization of the entropy introduced above
(where entropy has the parameter ↵ = 1). Max-entropy (↵ =
0) indicates the maximum uncertainty the adversary can have
when all members of the anonymity set are equally likely.
Max-entropy represents an upper limit on privacy, and Fig. 6
shows that its behavior is similar to the anonymity set size.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 6. Max-entropy
In contrast, min-entropy (↵ = 1, Fig. 7) focuses on the
target for which the adversary has the largest probability and
thus indicates a lower limit on privacy. Collision entropy (↵ =
2, not shown) indicates the uncertainty that two independent
samples from the adversary’s estimate are the same. Both min-
entropy and collision entropy behave similarly to entropy, but
indicate lower uncertainty values.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 7. Min-entropy
Cumulative entropy assumes that subsequent independent
applications of privacy mechanisms (e.g., mix zones) increase
the privacy of vehicles. Cumulative entropy thus adds up the
entropies from each application. In this study, we assume a
privacy mechanism is applied at every time step, and Fig. 8
shows the result at the last time step. The metric values
within each scenario behave as expected (increasing values
with decreasing adversary strength), but are hard to compare
between scenarios if the scenarios apply privacy mechanisms
a different number of times.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 8. Cumulative entropy
Because entropy is strongly influenced by low-probability
outliers, quantiles on entropy computes entropy based on only
those parts of the adversary’s estimated probability distrubtion
that are above a certain quantile. Our results, based on the 5%
quantile, are very similar to the results for entropy.
Conditional entropy (Fig. 9) describes how much informa-
tion (in bits) is needed to describe the ground truth, i.e. the true
mapping between observations and existing tracks, given that
the adversary’s estimated probabilities are known. The results
for conditional entropy are similar to the results for entropy.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 9. Conditional entropy
Inherent privacy (Fig. 10) and conditional privacy (not
shown) are based on entropy and conditional entropy, respec-
tively, and behave similarly to their base metrics. Instead of
expressing the adversary’s uncertainty in bits, these metrics
indicate how many yes/no questions the adversary would have
to ask to describe the ground truth.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 10. Inherent privacy
User-centric location privacy is based on entropy, but
assumes that after the application of a privacy mechanism, a
user’s privacy decays over time with a user-specified rate l. We
assume a fresh application of a privacy mechanism whenever
a vehicles anonymity set size is greater than 1. Fig. 11 shows
that the results for l = 0.9 are almost always zero, and thus
does not allow to distinguish strong and weak adversaries in
most cases (the results for other parameter settings are similar,
see Fig. 33).
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 11. User-centric location privacy with l = 0.9
B. Information Gain/Loss Metrics
The amount of leaked information (Fig. 12) indicates how
many vehicles the adversary was able to track correctly. The
values depend strongly on the total number of vehicles. In
Madrid, weaker adversaries track fewer vehicles than stronger
adversaries (as expected), however, the metric gives opposite
results in Rome, where weaker adversaries track more vehicles
correctly.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 12. Amount of leaked information
Relative entropy measures the distance between between the
adversary’s estimated probabilities and the ground truth and
expresses the amount of information the adversary loses by
approximating the ground truth with estimated probabilities.
Fig. 13 shows that the metric behaves as expected for Madrid,
indicating higher values for weaker adversaries. However, the
behavior is reversed in Rome.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 13. Relative entropy
Mutual information indicates the amount of information that
is shared between the distribution of the adversary’s estimate
and the ground truth. Fig. 14 shows that the amount decreases
with decreasing adversary strength, but not all adversary
strengths in the Rome scenario can be distinguished.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 14. Mutual information
Conditional privacy loss is based on mutual information
and measures the fraction of privacy lost through the adver-
sary’s estimate. As expected, the privacy loss decreases with
decreasing adversary strength. However, the privacy loss in
Rome seems very small compared to the privacy indicated by
other metrics such as the adversary’s success rate (Fig. 21) or
the amount of information leaked (Fig. 12).
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 15. Conditional privacy loss
Loss of anonymity describes how much information can
be learned from the adversary’s estimate (in terms of mutual
information) for the least private distribution of true outcomes.
As Fig. 16 shows, this always corresponds to the maximum
amount of mutual information across all adversary levels and
thus does not allow to distinguish between adversaries of
different strengths.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 16. Loss of anonymity
Information surprisal describes how much information is
contained in the adversary’s estimate of the true outcome,
indicating how surprised the adversary would be upon learning
the true outcome. Fig. 17 shows that the metric behaves as
expected for Rome, but shows increasing instead of decreasing
values for Madrid.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 17. Information surprisal
Increase in adversary’s belief measures the difference be-
tween the adversary’s estimates in the current and previous
time step. As Fig. 18 shows, the differences are very small
and can be both positive and negative. Therefore, this metric
does not seem suitable to indicate privacy against a tracking
adversary in vehicular communications.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 18. Increase in adversary’s belief
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, a standard tool in statis-
tics, measures the degree of linear dependence between the
adversary’s estimate and the ground truth, with a lower co-
efficient indicating higher privacy. Fig. 19 shows that the
correlation is decreasing with decreasing adversary strength,
but with low correlation values throughout.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 19. Pearson’s correlation coefficient
C. Data Similarity Metrics
Normalized variance measures the dispersion between the
adversary’s estimate and the ground truth. Fig. 20 shows
good results for Madrid (increasing dispersion with decreasing
adversary strength), but inconsistent dispersion values for
Rome.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 20. Normalized variance
D. Adversary’s Success Probability Metrics
The adversary’s success rate indicates the percentage of
vehicles that were tracked correctly. The success rate (Fig. 21)
shows decreasing privacy for increasing adversary strength in
both scenarios. In Madrid, the metric indicates 100% success,
i.e. zero privacy, for the five strongest adversary levels. This
is in contrast to other metrics that do indicate some amount
of privacy in these cases, e.g. cumulative entropy or the
anonymity set size.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 21. Adversarys success rate
User-specified innocence indicates the number of vehicles
for which the adversary’s probability for the true outcome
is below a user-specified threshold t, indicating how many
vehicles are unlikely to be tracked. Fig. 22 shows user-
specified innocence for a threshold of t = 0.7 (results for
other thresholds are in Section IV-G). As expected, the values
increase with adversary strength in both scenarios. However,
the metric values are hard to interpret without knowing the
total number of vehicles in a scenario.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 22. User specified innocence with t = 0.7
The privacy breach level indicates the adversary’s probabil-
ity for the true outcome. Fig. 23 shows that, as expected, the
privacy breach level decreases with the adversary strength in
both scenarios.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 23. Privacy breach level
The hiding property indicates the number of vehicles for
which the highest probability in the adversary’s estimate is
below a threshold t. This can be interpreted as the number of
vehicles for which the adversary is uncertain of how to con-
tinue their tracks. Fig. 24 shows that the values for a threshold
of t = 0.7 increase with decreasing adversary strength (as
expected). However, the values are hard to interpret without
knowing the total number of vehicles in a scenario.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 24. Hiding property with t = 0.7
E. Error Metrics
The expected estimation error measures the expected Eu-
clidean distance (in meters) between the adversary’s estimated
location and the vehicle’s true location. As expected, the
distance error increases with decreasing adversary strength in
both scenarios. The error is much smaller in Madrid which is
likely caused by more regular traffic patterns on a highway
and more frequent location updates.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 25. Expected estimation error
Incorrectness is a variant of the expected estimation error
that replaces the Euclidean distance with a distance that
indicates 0 for the correct guess and 1 otherwise. That is,
incorrectness indicates the adversary’s probability of error and
thus mirrors the results for the adversary’s success rate. As
Fig. 26 shows, weaker adversaries have higher incorrectness
in both scenarios.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 26. Incorrectness
The mean squared error is often used in statistical parameter
estimations and indicates the error between the adversary’s
estimated distribution and the true outcome. Fig. 27 shows that
the error values are very small and almost indistinguishable in
both scenarios. In addition, contrary to expectation, the metric
indicates smaller errors for weaker adversaries in Rome.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 27. Mean squared error
Percentage incorrectly classified (Fig. 28) indicates the
percentage of vehicles that were not tracked correctly. This is a
normalized and inverted version of the amount of information
leaked (see Fig. 12). Contrary to the earlier metric, however,
normalization makes this metric more accurate in that weaker
adversaries now consistently show a higher percentage of
incorrect classifications.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 28. Percentage incorrectly classified
F. Time Metrics
Maximum tracking time assumes that a vehicle is certain to
be tracked if its anonymity set contains only the vehicle itself.
The metric thus indicates the cumulative time (in seconds)
during which a vehicle’s anonymity set size is 1. Fig. 29 shows
that this time is very small in both scenarios, indicating that
the anonymity set size is rarely 1 (we have already seen that
this does not impede the adversary’s ability to track vehicles,
see Fig. 21). Against an adversary who can track successfully
even with larger anonymity sets, this metric does not seem to
provide a useful indication of privacy.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 29. Maximum tracking time
Time to confusion assumes that the adversary is confused
when entropy is below a threshold h. The metric gives the
cumulative time (in seconds) during which this is the case.
Fig. 30 uses a confusion threshold of h = 0.5 (results for
other thresholds are in Fig. 33) and shows that, as expected,
weaker adversaries have a shorter time during which they are
confused.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 30. Time to confusion with h = 0.5
Time to first confusion gives the first time when entropy
drops below the threshold h. Fig. 31 shows that this metric
gives much less consistent results than the cumulative time to
confusion, most likely caused by brief drops of entropy early
in the scenario.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 31. Time to first confusion with h = 0.5
Distance to confusion indicates the cumulative distance
traveled while the adversary was confused, and distance to
first confusion indicates the distance until the first time of
confusion. The results for these metrics mirror the results for
the time to confusion metrics.
Mean tracking duration indicates how long, on average,
each vehicle could be tracked correctly. Fig. 32 shows that
the values for the two scenarios are of similar magnitude,
even though the Rome scenario is almost twice as long as
the Madrid scenario. In addition, the metric does not take
into account that vehicles in the highway scenarios pass
through the highway in a linear fashion, thus spending a
limited amount of time, whereas vehicles in the inner-city
scenario remain for a longer period. This metric thus seems
suitable for within-scenario comparisons, but of limited value
in comparing different scenarios.
(a) Madrid, A6, Monday 11am (b) Rome, Monday 1pm
Fig. 32. Mean tracking duration
G. Aggregated Results
Fig. 33 shows the full results for monotonicity for all
metrics, all parameter levels, and all scenarios. Each square
of the heatmap is determined by one set of results presented
in detailed plots above. For example, the top-left square
summarizes the results of Fig. 21a (adversary’s success rate
for Madrid, Monday 11am).
Influence of parameter settings. We evaluated how pa-
rameter settings influence the strength of the parameterized
metrics. Fig. 33 shows that time/distance to confusion are
stronger if the threshold is small (e.g., h = 0.1), whereas the
strength of time/distance to first confusion and user-centric
location privacy does not depend on the choice of threshold.
Hiding property and user-specified innocence are stronger if
the threshold is large (e.g., t = 0.9).
Influence of traffic conditions. Fig. 33 illustrates the
influence of traffic conditions on the strength of privacy
metrics. The heat map clearly shows that the strength of most
metrics fluctuates between scenarios and traffic conditions
(for example, time/distance to confusion, mean squared error,
relative entropy). If these metrics are selected to evaluate a
new privacy protection technology, it is neccessary to validate
their strength for the specific scenario.
Metrics suites. To offset weaknesses in metrics, several
metrics can be combined in a metrics suite that includes
strong metrics, metrics from each of Sections IV-A to IV-F,
and metrics for between-scenario comparisons. An example
metrics suite could thus consist of normalized entropy, mutual
information, normalized variance, the adversary’s success rate,
the expected estimation error, and the time to confusion.
V. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated the strength of 37 privacy metrics for
vehicular communications privacy in terms of their monotonic-
ity and comparability between traffic conditions. We found
that only few metrics are strong across all conditions, while
most metrics are weak at least in some conditions. It is not
immediately clear what causes these weaknesses, and therefore
we have two recommendations how privacy metrics for the
evaluation of new privacy protection technologies should be
selected: (1) To evaluate the strength of the selected privacy
metrics in each specific scenario before committing to their
usage, and (2) to always use metrics suites, i.e. to combine
several strong metrics from different categories.
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Fig. 33. Strength of privacy metrics shown in a heat map. The colors indicate
the strength of the metric (from blue=strong to yellow=weak).
